For organizatio ns to be effective, their employees need to rely upon each other even when they do not trust each other. One tool managers can use to promote trust-like behavior is monitoring. In this article we report results from a laboratory study that describes the relationship between monitoring and trust behavior. We randomly and anonymously paired participants (n=210) with the same partner, and had them make 15 rounds of trust game decisions. We find predictable main effects (e.g., frequent monitoring increases trust behavior) as well as interesting strategic behavior. Specifically, we find that anticipated monitoring schemes (i.e., when participants know before they make a decision that they either will or will not be monitored) significantly increase trust behavior in monitored rounds, but decrease trust behavior overall. Participants in our study also reacted to information they learned about their counterpart differently as a function of whether or not monitoring was anticipated. Participants were less trusting when they observed trustworthy behavior in an anticipated monitoring period than when they observed trustworthy behavior in an unanticipated monitoring period. In many cases, participants in our study systematically anticipated their counterpart's untrustworthy behavior. We discuss implication of these results for models of trust and offer managerial prescriptions.
INTRODUCTION
Managers, employees, and customers routinely rely on others to choose trustworthy actions. Managers expect employees to complete their work, employees expect to be paid, and customers expect goods and services to be delivered on time. In some cases, people choose trustworthy actions because they are genuinely trustworthy people. In other cases, however, people choose trustworthy actions because they are concerned with the consequences of being caught engaging in untrustworthy actions. In this article, we examine the influence of monitoring on trustworthy and trusting behavior.
We conceptualize monitoring as a tool that can promote trust-like behavior, and we investigate the relationship between different monitoring systems and the trust-like actions people choose.
In general, trust reduces transaction costs and improves the efficiency of economic transactions (Bromily & Cummings, 1995; Hirsch, 1978; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) . At the managerial level, trust enables managers to negotiate more efficiently (Bazerman, 1994) and lead more effectively (Atwater, 1988) . Managers, however, often have difficulty judging others (Wu, Heath, & Kne z, 2003) , and in many organizational settings, including negotiations (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999) , sales (Santoro & Paine, 1993) , and accounting (Chang & Schultz, 1990; Degeorge, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 1999) , people routinely enga ge in untrustworthy and unethical behavior (Carr, 1968) . Even in settings where people cannot or do not trust each other, however, people often act in trusting and trustworthy ways and reap economic and social benefits from exchanges. In practice, across many organizational settings managers Monitoring and Trust 4 need to be both trusting and cautious. In this paper we investigate the question of how managers should monitor the actions of others when trust is low.
We report results from a laboratory study using a repeated version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) . In our experiment, we measure behavior that reflects trusting and trustworthy behavior, and we examine the influence of different monitoring systems on this behavior.
Trust and Monitoring
Prior work has considered a wide range of trust relationships (see Ross & LaCroix, 1996 for a review). In this article, we focus on repeated interactions in emerging relationships. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) and Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) define early stage trust relationships as calculus-based relationships. In these relationships people "calculate" the costs and benefits of keeping or breaking trust. Relative to well-developed or mature relationships, calculus-based trust is easily broken and (relatively) easily repaired.
Several recent studies have explored trust behavior in experimental settings. This work has identified a number of individual and contextual factors that influence trust.
These include solidarity, familiarity, a common nationality (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000) , and cultural orientation (Buchan, & Croson, 1999) , as well as contextual factors such as non-task communication (Buchan, & Croson, 1999) and the stage of the game (Ho & Weigelt, 2001) . In fact, even the labels used to describe a counterpart influences trust. Labeling a counterpart as a partner increases trust, while labeling a counterpart as an opponent decreases trust (Brunham, McCabe, & Smith, 2000) .
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While much of the experimental work investigating trust has used a version of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) , related work has investigated cooperation using paradigms such as repeated prisoners dilemma games (Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan 1999) and repeated ultimatum games (Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000) .
This work has identified important dynamic changes in behavior such as a link between revealed deception and retribution. For example, in repeated ultimatum games responders are more likely to reject offers of proposers when they used deception in the past (Bo les, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000) .
No prior experimental work, however, has investigated the interplay between monitoring and trust behavior. This problem, however, is clearly an important one for both theoretical and practical reasons. Managers make important decisions to trust and to monitor the actions of others. In many cases, these decisions are made selectively (e.g., using a mixed strategy; Amaldoss & Jain, 2002) . For example, some managers randomly drug test employees, conduct audits, and even listen in on employee phone calls (e.g., in call centers). In one study, Aiello (1993) documented the purchase of surveillance software between 1990 and 1992. He found that over 70,000 U.S. companies made at least one such purchase, at a total cost of more than $500 million. The goal of this work is to examine the dynamics of monitoring and trust behavior.
II. HYPOTHESIS
We conceptualize monitoring as a tool to produce trust-like behavior, and we consider ways in which monitoring changes incentives for engaging in trust behavior. We adopt a functional view of trust by assuming individuals calculate the costs and benefits
Monitoring and Trust 6 of engaging in trust behavior in a manner consistent with Ajzen's (1985 Ajzen's ( , 1987 theory of planned behavior. In particular, we focus on the role of monitoring systems in altering the expected costs and benefits of choosing trust-like actions. This conceptualization matches our experimental design, because participants in our study are paid for their outcomes and remain anonymous to their counterpart. There is no way for participants to find out who their partners are, and as a result, participants in our study face a well-defined "shadow of the future" defined by the future rounds of a repeated trust game.
In developing our hypotheses we make two assumptions about trust. First, we assume that individuals maximize their long-term profits when they are trusted by others, but maximize their short-term profits when they choose untrustworthy actions. In our experiment, the repeated trust-game framework matches this incentive structure. Second, we assume that people reciprocate trust-like actions. That is, people are more likely to (dis)trust their counterpart when they observe their counterpart engaging in (un)trustworthy behavior (Gibson, Bottom, & Murnighan, 1999 behavior is more likely to be detected and subsequently punished or reciprocated. As a result, if players are calculative and maximize their total payoff for the entire interaction, they will exhibit more trust-like behavior w hen they experience more frequent monitoring.
H1: Frequent monitoring will increase overall trust-like behavior.
We also expect anticipated monitoring to significantly influence behavior.
Specifically, if a decision maker anticipates that his or her actions will be monitored during a specific period of time, we expect the decision maker to be more likely t o engage in trust-like behavior for that period. In anticipated monitoring periods, the decision maker knows that his or her actions will be observed, and the expected costs of engaging in untrustworthy actions in these periods are particularly high. Observed untrustworthy actions harm trust, and prior work demonstrates that the trust recovery process is both slow and costly (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2004; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004) . Consequently, we hypothesize that players will be particularly likely to engage in trust-like behavior in anticipated monitoring rounds.
H2: Anticipated monitoring will increase trust-like behavior for anticipated monitoring
rounds.
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Although an anticipated monitoring scheme is likely to increase trust-like behavior in periods when monitoring is anticipated, anticipated monitoring schemes may decrease trust-like behavior in periods when no monitoring is anticipated for two reasons.
First, anticipated monitoring schemes lower the costs of engaging in untrustworthy actions in anticipated, non-monitored periods. In anticipated monitoring schemes, participants know when their actions will be observed-and when their actions will not be observed. In non-monitoring periods, participants face no adverse economic consequences for choosing untrustworthy actions.
Second, anticipated monitoring schemes decrease trust-like behavior in periods of no monitoring by harming trust development. Players who observe others choosing trustworthy actions in anticipated monitoring periods may attribute the trustworthy behavior they observe to the monitoring scheme rather than the trustworthiness of the individual.
As a result, players who observe trustworthy behavior in anticipated monitoring periods may be less likely to assume that their counterpart will choose trustworthy actions when they are not monitored. As a result, trustworthy actions are less diagnostic of true trustworthiness and less effective in building trust when the observed trust behavior occurs in an anticipated period of monitoring.
For both of these reasons, we hypothesize that anticipated monitoring will decrease trust-like behavior in non-monitored rounds.
H3: Anticipated monitoring will decrease trust-like behavior in rounds when participants
are not monitored.
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III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS
We recruited participants for an experiment in decision making from class announcements. Prospective participants were told that they would have the opportunity to earn money in the experiment and that the amount they earned would depend upon their own decisions, the decisions of others, and upon chance.
Upon arrival to the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either the Odd or the Even role. Participants in the two roles were separated and anonymously paired with a member of the opposite role.
In this experiment participants played 15 rounds of the trust game depicted in Dyads were randomly assigned to one of four between-subject monitoring conditions. The four conditions result from a 2x2 design. We assigned dyads to one of two "frequency of monitoring" conditions (frequent monitoring or infrequent monitoring) and to one of two "anticipated monitoring" conditions (antic ipated monitoring or unanticipated monitoring). We also manipulated whethe r or not monitoring rounds were anticipated. In the anticipated condition we indicated on each participant's decision sheet whether or not a round was a monitoring round before they made their decision for that round. In the unanticipated condition we indicated whether or not a round was a monitoring round only after they had made their decision for that round. As a practical matter, participants knew the total number of monitoring rounds they would encounter and could update their probability estimates tha t an upcoming round would be a monitoring round.
At the conclusion of the experiment we gave participants feedback (monitoring)
for every round and paid them based upon the total number of points they earned. We paid participants $1 for every 5 points they earned.
IV. RESULTS
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A. Model
We fit two related logit models to our data. These models represent the likelihood a participant will choose a trusting or trustworthy action as a function of the treatment variables and the amount of trust-like behavior s/he has observed. We define trusting behavior as the Odd player decision to pass, and we define trustworthy behavior as the Even player decision to return at least 6 (Model 1) or to return at least 4 (Model 2) of the 10 points. Both models take the standard logistic functional form as follows: or Even (E), and we include α as a model intercept to allow for differences in the propensity to engage in trust-like behavior between Odd and Even players.
We represent the experimental conditions with A and H. We set A equal to 1 for the anticipated monitoring conditions and 0 for the unanticipated monitoring conditions, and we set H equal to 1 for the frequent monitoring conditions (10 rounds of monitoring), and 0 for the infrequent monitoring conditions (5 rounds of monitoring).
M(r)
represents whether or not round r is a monitoring round. We set M(r) equal to 1 for a monitoring round, and 0 for a non monitoring round. In our model the parameter estimate β iMA (when M(r)*A = 1) measures how trust-like behavior might be different in monitored rounds in the anticipated monitoring condition.
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The model also includes a variable, n(r), to represent prior observations of trustlike behavior. Specifically, n(r) represents the fraction of observed (monitoring) rounds that include trustworthy or trusting behavior in rounds 1 through r-1. This fraction represents trust-building from observed behavior. We expect the importance of observed behavior to differ across anticipated and unanticipated conditions, so we also include an interaction term n(r)*A to account for the potential moderating effect of anticipated monitoring.
B. Participants
A total of 210 participants completed the experiment. These participants created 105 dyads. Each dyad was randomly assigned to each of the four conditions; a total of 24 dyads completed the unanticipated infrequent condition, 23 dyads completed the unanticipated frequent condition, 26 dyads completed the anticipated infrequent condition, and 32 completed the anticipated frequent condition. We report results from our model and discuss patterns of strategic behavior across these conditions.
C. Trusting Results
We depict results from our models in Tables 1 and 2 . Both models yield very similar results. In each round Odd players could either pass, a trust-like action, or take, and Even players could choose to return either a substantial amount, a trustworthy action, or a small amount. The first set of parameter estimates in tables 1 and 2 describe the influence of monitoring on the likelihood that Odd players will pass.
Our first hypothesis predicts that frequent monitoring will increase trust-like behavior. We find support for this hypothesis across both models; the parameter Monitoring and Trust 13 estimates for β ΟH are positive and significant for models 1 and 2, 0.18 (.17), p=.01 and 0.19 (.10), p=.05, respectively.
Our second and third hypotheses predict that anticipated monitoring will increase trust-like behavior for anticipated monitoring rounds, but decrease trust-like behavior overall. The β ΟMA parameter estimates are positive and significant for both models, 2.28 (.15) and 2.31 (.12), p<.01, and the β ΟA parameter estimates are negative and significant for both models, -.91 (.20) and -1.05 (.19), p<.01. That is, while anticipated monitoring increases trust-like behavior for specific anticipated monitoring rounds, it harms trust-like behavior overall.
We next consider the influence of experience on trust-like behavior. Specifically, we examine whether Odd pla yers will be more trusting when they observe trustworthy behavior and whether Odd players will be less influenced by trustworthy observations when monitoring is anticipated. We find evidence for both. When Odd players observed trustworthy actions they were more likely to pass to their Even player counterpart; parameter estimates for γ n(t) are 0.59 (.07) and 0.91 (.08), p<.01 for models 1 and 2. In addition, Odd players discounted the trustworthy behavior they observed when that behavior occurred in an antic ipated monitoring round; parameter estimates for γ An(t) are -.24 (.11), p=.03 and -.29 (.14), p=.04 for models 1 and 2. That is, the trustworthy behavior Odd players observed influence their subsequent actions, but the same behavior influences their sub sequent actions less if it occurs in anticipated monitoring rounds.
D. Trustworthy Behavior
We find a similar set of results for trustworthy behavior. Even players decided how much to return to their Odd player counterpart. Even players could choose to return Monitoring and Trust 14 either a substantial amount (at least 4 or at least 6 of the potential 10 points) or a small amount (e.g., 2 or 0). The second set of parameter estimates in tables 1 and 2 describe the influence of monitoring and observed behavior on the likelihood that Even players will choose trustworthy actions by choosing to return a substantial amount of the potential 10 points (at least 6 in Model 1 and at least 4 in Model 2).
Our first hypothesis predicts that frequent monitoring will increase trustworthy behavior. We find support for this hypothesis across both models; the parameter estimates for β ΕH are positive and significant for models 1 and 2, 0.54 (.10) and .31 (.08), p<.01 for both models.
Our second and third hypotheses predict that anticipated monitoring will increase trustworthy behavior for anticipated monitoring rounds, but decrease trustworthy behavior overall. Across both models the β ΕMA parameter estimates are positive and significant, 2.07 (.13) and 2.10 (.16), p<.01 for both models, and the β ΕA parameter estimates are negative and significant, -1.67 (.18) and -1.61 (.29), p<.01 for both models.
That is, while anticipated monitoring increases trust-like behavior for specific, anticipated monitoring rounds, it harms trust overall.
We next consider the influence of experience on trust-like behavior. We conjecture that Even players will be more trustworthy when they observe trusting behavior, and that Even players will be less influenced by these observations when monitoring is anticipated. We find that when Even players observe trusting actions they are more likely to return a substantial amount to their Odd player counterpart; parameter estimates for γ Εn(t) are 0.21 (.07) and 0.24 (.07), p<.01 for both models. Even players, however, do not change their behavior as a function of whether or not the trusting Monitoring and Trust 15 behavior they observe occurred in an anticipated monitoring round; parameter estimates for γ ΕAn(t) are 0.26 (.14) p=.06 and .20 (.14) p=.16, for models 1 and 2.
E. Strategic Behavior
Consistent with results from our model, we find that Odd players often anticipated Even players' behavior. As we depict in Figures 2 and 3 , we find that Even players were most likely to choose trustworthy actions and that Odd players were most likely to choose trusting actions in rounds with anticipated monitoring. Conversely, Even players were least likely to choose trustworthy actions and Odd players were least likely to choose trusting actions in rounds when they anticipated no monitoring. 
V. DISCUSSION
While prior work has argued that trust is an essential ingredient for managerial effectiveness (Atwater, 1988) , many relationships within organizations lack trust. For example, managers within large organizations with high turnover may not have sufficient time to develop trust among all of their employees. Even in the absence of actual trust, however, managers need to induce trust-like behavior. In this article we conceptualize monitoring as a substitute for trust, and we demonstrate that monitoring systems significantly influence trust-like behavior.
We report results from a laboratory experiment that describes important relationships between different monitoring conditions and behavior. First, we find that frequent monitoring increases overall trust-like behavior. Second, we find that anticipated monitoring harms overall trust-like behavior, but significantly increases trust-like behavior for periods in which monitoring is anticipated; in our study, Even players were particularly trustworthy in anticipated monitoring rounds, but were particularly untrustworthy when they anticipated no monitoring.
Our results also demonstrate that people anticipated the strategic trust-like actions of their counterpart. For examp le, Even players often attempted to take all of the money (points) when they could not be observed (e.g., anticipated no monitoring rounds).
Anticipating this, Odd players rarely passed in these rounds.
The decisions our participants made were also influenced by the set of actions they observed. Specifically, Odd players were more trusting when they had observed trustworthy behavior. Prior work has found that people often under-attribute behavior in strategic games to contextual factors (Weber, Camerer, R ottenstreich, & Knez, 2001; Weber & Camerer, 2003) , but in our study, Odd players were very sensitive to whether or not the behavior they observed occurred when monitoring was anticipated or unanticipated. Odd players were less trusting when the trustworthy behavior they observed occurred when monitoring was anticipated than when it was unanticipated.
Although we find significant differences in behavior across anticipated and unanticipated monitoring conditions, these differences are probably understated by the design of this experiment. In each condition participants knew the total number of monitoring rounds they would encounter. As a result, in later rounds of the experiment participants in the unanticipated conditions could update their beliefs about the likelihood that an upcoming round would be a monitoring round. In these cases, behavior in unanticipated monitoring conditions is likely to mirror behavior in anticipated monitoring conditions.
By design we paired participants randomly and anonymously. Our participants had no communication and they had no history with their partner. This aspect of our design enables us to focus our attention on our treatment conditions (i.e., to gauge the effects of monitoring in a calculus-based trust environment) by controlling for relationship and communication effects. Future work, however, should extend our investigation of the dynamics between monitoring and trust-like behavior to richer environments. For example, communication may facilitate trust-like behavior.
Communication could help trustors promote trustworthy behavior with promises (Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2004) , facilitate relationship development, and articulate consequence of observed trust violations. As a result, we expect communication to moderate the relationship between monitoring and trust-like behavior.
Another important direction for future research is the interplay between monitoring and trust development itself. By implementing a monitoring system managers may actually impede trust development. Cialdini (1996) notes that when employees are monitored it communicates to them that they are not trusted. This can create psychological reactance, as employees develop beliefs about their own behavior consistent with low expectations. Employees may come to attribute their own trust-like behavior to the monitoring system rather than to underlying feelings of trust. Ultimately, the use of a monitoring system may lead otherwise trustworthy employees to act in untrustworthy ways when they are not monitored.
Monitoring may also harm performance more broadly. The mere presence of a monitoring system may create anxiety and change behavior in unintended ways. For example, Hochschild (1983) documented how the fear of monitoring among Delta
Airlines flight attendants harmed their performance. An additional concern about the unintended consequences of monitoring is the effect of monitoring on those who do the monitoring. Kruglanski (1970) demonstrates that people who conduct surveillance become less trusting.
Future work should also examine the role of monitoring with respect to organizational culture. Organization culture impacts a number of organizational behaviors related to trust-like behavior (Wimbush & Shepard, 1994) , and recent experimental work has begun to identify important dynamics of organizational culture (Weber & Camerer, 2003) . Some organizational cultures may require more active monitoring than others and some organizational cultures are likely to be more receptive to monitoring than others. In addition, the use of monitoring itself is likely to impact organizational culture by communicating a set of standards (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Monitoring and Trust 20 Messick, & Bazerman, 2000) and shifting the focus of managerial attention (Sims & Brinkmann, 2002 
